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SecureWeb: Protecting Sensitive Information Through the Web
Browser Extension with a Security Token
Shuang Liang, Yue Zhang, Bo Li, Xiaojie Guo, Chunfu Jia, and Zheli Liu
Abstract: The leakage of sensitive data occurs on a large scale and with increasingly serious impact. It may cause
privacy disclosure or even property damage. Password leakage is one of the fundamental reasons for information
leakage, and its importance is must be emphasized because users are likely to use the same passwords for different
Web application accounts. Existing approaches use a password manager and encrypted Web application to protect
passwords and other sensitive data; however, they may be compromised or lack accessibility. The paper presents
SecureWeb, which is a secure, practical, and user-controllable framework for mitigating the leakage of sensitive
data. SecureWeb protects users’ passwords and aims to provide a unified protection solution to diverse sensitive
data. The efficiency of the developed schemes is demonstrated and the results indicate that it has a low overhead
and are of practical use.
Key words: password manager; data privacy; format-preserving encryption; Shadow Document Object Model
(DOM)
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Introduction

With the development of Web application systems, an
increasing amount of user data is stored on the servers
of online service providers. At the same time, the
impact of sensitive information leakage is growing.
Many financial, online payment, and other
applications are based on the Web where the user’s
password, credit card number, and other information
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will become the main target of the attacker. There are
various means for attackers to steal the sensitive data,
such as compromising the Web application server,
sniffing the network, or injecting malicious client-side
code. Sensitive data leakage results in significant
damage.
1.1

Motivation

The best way to protect sensitive data is to let its
owner to encrypt it and be the only one who can
decrypt it correctly. By giving users full control of their
information, the risk caused by a compromised online
server can be reduced. Many studies have focused on
this idea, but all face the same challenge, which is
key management. Some of the existing methods store
the encryption key on the user’s personal computer,
but an issue occurs when the same user wants to use
another computer. Aiming to increase flexibility, other
methods choose to store the key on online server, which
is contrary to their original intention. What is more,
the encryption and decryption processes are normally
executed by Web browsers, which are undoubtedly less
secure than executing the process by a stub program on
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a local computer[1] .
Common experience informs us that the password is
the most valuable and vulnerable aspect of sensitive
data. Until now, the password remains as the key
component of most online authentication systems and
a password leak directly threatens users. To enhance
password security, the user should use unique and
strong passwords for different accounts[2–4] . However,
it greatly increases the memory burden. As a result,
many users choose to use same passwords on different
websites, which is risky. This is because a hacker who
has conquered a website also has the correct credentials
for other websites.
This paper aims to protect the security of sensitive
data, especially the security of passwords. The goal
is to give users complete control of their personal
data while maintaining accessibility. The confidentiality
of the sensitive data should be guaranteed by the
cryptographic operations executed on the user’s local
computer, which can prevent the leakage of data from
the computing environment.
1.2

Contribution

Based on these motivations, the SecureWeb framework
is proposed, which is designed to encrypt sensitive data
under the control of its owners. It uses a U-disk as
the security token to authenticate users and enhance
security. The key is stored in the U-disk rather than the
local computer or the online server. Users hold the key
so that they can control their own data. Choosing U-disk
as the security token is a solution that maintains both the
security and accessibility of the data. It is inexpensive
and portable, so users can still read their data even if
they change computers. In addition, SecureWeb builds
a secure environment through the browser extension.
What’s more, it implements the encryption and the
decryption process by a stub program on the user’s local
computer.
To protect the security of passwords, SecurePWD
(shorted for SecurePassword) was implemented based
on the SecureWeb framework. Password managers can
manage passwords for users, but none of the current
products can provide a secure input environment that
prevents a malicious client-side code from capturing
user inputs. Fortunately, the new technique, Shadow
Document Object Model (DOM), can build a secure
input environment by isolating application DOM. One
of the best solutions is to use a password manager
combined with Shadow DOM to achieve security and
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also ensure availability. This approach is unique. The
SecurePWD can construct the secure environment by
applying the Shadow DOM. With SecurePWD, users
can retrieve different passwords for different Web sites
on the basis of the unique master password.
To protect the sensitive data, SecureData is
implemented and is based on the SecureWeb
framework, too. It can be seen as an extension
of SecurePWD. Besides the protection of
users’ passwords, SecureData gives a common
implementation to put users in control of their sensitive
data. SecureData provides a unified protection solution
to diverse sensitive data.

2

Related Work

2.1

Encrypted Web application

Web applications usually store sensitive data generated
by users. Users may worry about the personal data
privacy or information privacy due to compromised or
curious Web applications. The best solution is to store
the encrypted data such that it can only be decrypted by
the owner.
Recently, studies[5–11] have focused on data security
and privacy preservation, and have proposed many
useful solutions. They show that there are three
chokepoints that may leak a user’s sensitive data in
Web applications. As shown in Fig. 1, the data can be
leaked: (1) from the database of the application server
in chokepoint (a); (2) when transferred over the Internet
in chokepoint (b); and (3) by malicious client-side code
in chokepoint (c).
To encrypt Web application data, many proposals
adopt the approach of encrypting the data at one of
the three chokepoints. It is clear that a higher security
level will be achieved when the chokepoint is further
to the right. However, it is a huge challenge to make
the encryption controlled by the user while maintaining
transparency.
ShadowCrypt[8] , which is proposed in ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), enables users to encrypt the sensitive
data in chokepoint (c). It stores the encryption

Fig. 1

Chokepoints for data leak in Web applications.
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key on the user’s computer and performs the
encryption and decryption operations in the browser
extension. However, users cannot control their
encryption key directly by themselves. In addition,
once the user changes a computer, the encrypted data
cannot be decrypted correctly. In other words, it lacks
accessibility.
2.2

Password manager

Data leak, especially password leak, is a huge risk to
Web application users. To enhance password security,
only unique and strong passwords should be utilized;
nevertheless, this greatly increases a burden on the
user’s memory. The password manager can help users
to store and organize their passwords. Most of them are
based on the following methods.
 Web-based password manager. This stores users’
passwords on the online service provider’s servers.
LastPass[12] and RoboForm[13] , which are based on this
method, encrypt a user’s password database using the
user’s master password. But if the master password
is not a very strong one, or the user uses the same
password on the other sites, the user risks losing all of
their secrets. Many studies[14–16] show that most Webbased password managers have a large attack surface.
Recently, a group of security experts from Team
Security Is Key (SIK) of the Fraunhofer Institute for
Secure Information Technology in Germany found that
many Web-based password managers, such as LastPass,
hardcode the master password in its application and can
therefore leak users’ privacy data[17] . What’s more, the
Web-based password manager stores credentials on the
cloud that can easily be a target for attackers. If the
service provider’s server is intruded, the user will face a
huge risk.
 Local password manager. This works similarly to
the online Web-based password manager. The local
password manager just saves the encrypted password
database on user’s computer rather than on the Web. It
avoids the security weakness of storing online. Popular
ones include 1password[18] and the desktop version of
RoboForm[13] . Team SIK also found that 1password is
vulnerable[17] . Besides, the biggest weakness of the
Table 1

local password managers is the lack of accessibility.
 Security token password manager. It manages
user’s passwords with a security token. It is seen as
the best way to authenticate users. The data stored
in the token is usually encrypted to prevent it from
unauthorized probing and reading. However, the main
disadvantage of it is the cost of ownership. Users may
not use the security token password managers due to this
reason.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the above
password managers. As can be seen, none of them reach
the ideal expectation. A good password manager must
have a small attack surface, high accessibility, and low
cost.
However, using a password manager to organize
passwords does not mean that the passwords are secure.
Some studies[19–21] have proved that normal users’
passwords are far from secure against attacks. More
specifically, based on some known information of users,
attackers can guess the password with a very high
probability[21] . Therefore, only the random and unique
password is secure.

3

SecureWeb Architecture

To maximize the security of personal sensitive data,
SecureWeb aims to encrypt users’ data at chokepoint
(c). In order to give users complete control over
their personal sensitive data, SecureWeb stores the
encryption key in a U-disk that is convenient to carry
around and not expensive. What’s more, instead of
performing the encryption and decryption in the Web
browser, SecureWeb executes these operations in a stub
program, which further enhances the security.
3.1

System module

As shown in Fig. 2, SecureWeb contains three modules
(i.e., the secure environment module, the encryption
module, and the key management module) and a
communication protocol.
Secure environment module. This implements the
identification of sensitive fields and constructs a secure
environment by isolating the application DOM. This
module is implemented by the browser extension.

Contrastive study of different kinds of password managers.

Password manager
Web-based password manager
Local password manager
Security token password Manager

Attack surface
Large
Small
Small

Accessibility
High
Low
Medium/high

Cost
Low
Low
Medium/high
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Fig. 2

Modules of SecureWeb.

Encryption module. This uses the results of the
secure environment module as its input, processes (i.e.,
encrypts or decrypts) it based on different website
domains and a security token, and updates the new data
to the original fields. This module is implemented by
the stub program.
Key management module. This maintains a key file
in a security token that is the U-disk to authenticate
users.
Communication protocol. This is the protocol
between the secure environment module and
the encryption module. To guarantee the secure
transmission of the users’ data, the Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key exchange protocol is used.
The key challenge is how to process the sensitive
data. It all depends on whether the encrypted data need
to be decrypted or not, as will be described in Section
3.3.5.
3.2

Data flow

The data flow of SecureWeb will be briefly described.
The steps of the data flow go from 1 to 6, as shown in
Fig. 3.
Notice that SecureWeb needs an initialization when it
is first used. This is drawn as step 0. In Fig. 3, the solid
line presents the data flow that interacts directly with the
sensitive data, whereas the dashed lines do not. What’s
more, to simplify the data flow, the communication
protocol was omitted here.
Step 0. Initialization of key management module.
SecureWeb first generates the user key file which will
be provided to process the sensitive data. The key
management module dynamically obtains the physical
serial number of the specific security token, i.e., the Udisk. Then it uses this unique physical serial number to
encrypt the key file.

Fig. 3

Data flow of SecureWeb.
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Step 1. Identify the sensitive field and domain.
SecureWeb then identifies the sensitive fields in the
application code and builds a secure environment for
these fields. The cleartext of sensitive data interacts
directly with the secure environment rather than the
original Web page. SecureWeb will also identify the
domain name of the current Web page.
Step 2. Send the sensitive data and domain.
SecureWeb sends the sensitive data and the domain
name of the current Web site from the secure
environment module to the encryption module.
The secure environment module also establishes a
corresponding callback function to handle the data sent
back from the encryption module.
Step 3. Process the sensitive data. SecureWeb obtains
the U-disk physical serial number and uses it to
decrypt the key file. After decryption, SecureWeb gets
the content of the key file. Then, it conducts the
key dispersion and encrypts the domain name by a
encryption key read from the key file to get the session
key. Finally, it processes the sensitive data received
from the secure environment using the session key.
Step 4. Update the key file. SecureWeb updates the
key file with the time of last access and the frequency
of accesses.
Step 5. Send the processed data back. SecureWeb
sends the processed sensitive data back to the secure
environment module.
Step 6. Update the original Web page. The callback
function in the secure environment module receives the
processed data. Then SecureWeb updates the original
Web page with it.
3.3

Goals

The goals are to construct a sensitive data protection
mechanism with users’ complete control. In this
section, the security and usability goals are presented.
The non-goals that were not considered in SecureWeb
are also presented.
3.3.1

Security goals

The security goals of SecureWeb are as follows:
Avoid the compromised online storage device.
SecureWeb aims to put users in control of their data
and mitigate the privacy diffusion problem. The online
service provider’s server cannot read the cleartext of
users’ sensitive data. Therefore, SecureWeb can avoid
the risk of online storage devices being compromised.
Provide secure environment. SecureWeb aims to
ensure the security of sensitive data. To prevent the
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sensitive data from being stolen by the malicious
client-side code, SecureWeb provides a secure isolated
environment for users.
Ensure the security of the password. SecureWeb
aims to protect sensitive data, especially the password.
It aims to set a unique password for each website. Leaks
of the passwords from some weak websites will not
open the gate for the attacker to enter the other websites.
3.3.2

Usability goals

The usability goals of SecureWeb are as follows:
Transparent to the Web application. SecureWeb
focuses on supporting applications transparently. It will
not break the verification and other logic of the Web
application.
Accessible and inexpensive. SecureWeb uses a
security token to enhance the security for users. The
security token should be inexpensive and easy to carry
around. Besides, in contrast to the former method[8] ,
users can read their data in any computer with the
security token.
3.3.3

Non-goals

We do not aim to protect against the threats by losing
the security token. We assume that the user can prevent
the security token from being lost.
3.3.4

Security analysis

SecureWeb may have three threats, as shown in Fig. 4,
and they are as follows:
(1) Threats between the application code and the
secure environment module;
(2) Threats between the secure environment module
and the encryption module;
(3) Threats between the encryption module and the
key management module.
Claim 1 SecureWeb can resist attacks between the
application code and the secure environment module.
Proof The malicious client-side code can steal
user’s data if the secure environment module is
not isolated from the application code. Fortunately,
the new technique, named “Shadow DOM”, can

Fig. 4

Possible threats of SecureWeb.

isolate application DOM[8, 22] . This ensures the security
between the application code and secure environment
module.
Claim 2 SecureWeb can resist attacks between the
secure environment module and the encryption module.
Proof Attackers can steal user’s data by hook
function or other methods if the data is transferred in
plaintext. SecureWeb uses DH key exchange protocol
to prevent that exposure. Thus, the security between the
secure environment module and the encryption module
is guaranteed by our communication protocol.
Claim 3 SecureWeb can resist attacks between the
encryption module and the key management module.
Proof Attackers may steal the key file in order
to decrypt user’s encrypted data. But the key file is
encrypted by the physical serial number of the U-disk
that is dynamically obtained by SecureWeb. Thus, this
attack will be successful only when the attacker gets the
security token (i.e., U-disk). In this paper, it is assumed
users can prevent the security token from being stolen.
Therefore, the security between the encryption module
and the key management module is guaranteed.
3.3.5

Case study

As mentioned before, whether the encrypted data needs
to be decrypted or not, determines how SecureWeb
processes sensitive data. Two cases are considered,
which are called SecurePWD and SecureData,
respectively.
SecurePWD. The password is one of the most secret
and sensitive pieces of data that needs to be unique
and strong. One of the goals of SecureWeb is to
protect the security of passwords. The ideal solution
is to set a unique password for each website, but how
to manage these passwords is troublesome for users.
In this case, SecurePWD based on the SecureWeb
framework is implemented. SecurePWD encrypts the
master password that is input by users to get the login
password based on the current website domain and
the U-disk. SecurePWD generates different passwords
for different websites. Whenever users need to login,
SecurePWD will compute the current login password.
Therefore, SecurePWD is unidirectional and does not
need to process the decryption operation.
SecureData. SecureData is the general implementation of SecureWeb. It provides a unified
protection solution to diverse sensitive data. It encrypts
the sensitive data of users’ input. It differs from
SecurePWD in that SecureData is bidirectional, i.e., it
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needs to decrypt the ciphertext of the sensitive data in
order to present to users. SecureData needs to identify
the sensitive input widgets to encrypt the users’ input;
what’s more, it also needs to identify the encrypted
sensitive data to process the decryption.

4

SecurePWD Implementation

In this section, details about the implementations of
SecurePWD are provided.
4.1
4.1.1

Secure environment module
Overview

The secure environment module, running as a browser
extension, aims to provide a secure password input
environment for the user and prevent the master
password from being stolen by the malicious client-side
code (such as a Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attack).
It first traverses the input elements in the application
and finds the password input fields, then creates secure
input environments for these fields, and finally sends
the data (i.e., master password) obtained by the user’s
input to the encryption module. It will also receive the
encrypted data sent from the encryption module and
then update the value into the original password input
field of the webpage.
To achieve the isolation, the application DOM must
be isolated. There are several ways[8, 22] to isolate the
application DOM, such as iframe, modifying the DOM
Application Programming Interface (API), or Shadow
DOM:
 Iframe. This uses a browser’s built-in frame and
original isolation properties. However, this method may
bring discord because it disregards the surrounding
page’s text styling.
 Modifying the DOM API. One can override the
input element to provide an isolated secure widget. But
modifying the DOM API is a very complex and difficult
job. Without proficiency in formalizing the DOM API
and its semantics, this method seems hard to be realized.
 Shadow DOM. This is a new feature proposed in
the HTML 5 specification. It allows the Web developers
to encapsulate codes. It is flexible enough to use
Table 2
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Shadow DOM to isolate Web application DOM. This
will be described in more detail in the next section.
4.1.2

Shadow DOM

Shadow DOM provides encapsulation for DOM and
Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) in a Web component.
Shadow DOM makes them separate from the DOM of
the main document. It can prevent outside JavaScript
code from accessing the content in the shadow tree.
Now, it has been updated from version v0 to version
v1. The differences between the two versions are listed
in Table 2 and are as follows.
(1) Creating a shadow root. In Shadow DOM
v0, creating a shadow root is executed by function
Element.createShadowRoot();
while
in
Shadow DOM v1, it is executed by function
Element.attachShadow(). What’s more, a
mode that is a string specifying the encapsulation mode
for the shadow tree must be given as a parameter in that
function.
(2) Mode of the shadow root. There are two modes
of the shadow root: open and closed. With the
open mode, one can access the Shadow DOM via the
shadowRoot property of the HTML element. With
the closed mode, one cannot access anything inside
the shadow tree, and shadowRoot will return null,
i.e., the design goal of a closed mode is to disallow
any access to a node in a closed shadow root from the
outside world. Besides, in v0, a shadow root is always
open; in v1, it can be set to open or closed.
(3) Elements which can be shadow host. In
Shadow DOM v0, every element can be a shadow host.
In Shadow DOM v1, a limited number of elements can
be a shadow host. For example, the input element can
be a shadow host just in v0.
The nature of Shadow DOM composition is
explained more specifically with an example in
Fig. 5. A shadow tree is created with the HTML
paragraph element whose ID equals to “1” and serves
as the shadow host. A closed mode disallows any
access to a node in a shadow root from the outside
world. A new paragraph element is created whose ID
equals to “2” in the shadow tree. When executing

Differences between Shadow DOM v0 and Shadow DOM v1.

Difference

Shadow DOM v0

Creating a shadow root

Element.createShadowRoot()

Mode of the shadow root
Elements which can be shadow host

Open
Every element

Shadow DOM v1
Element.attachShadow(fmode:
“closed” or “open”g)
Open or closed
Partial elements
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Fig. 5

The sample of creating a shadow tree.

document.getElementByld (“2”) through the
console, null will be returned. That is, the outside
JavaScript code cannot acquire the content within
Shadow DOM, which exemplifies the encapsulation of
Shadow DOM.
The HTML page generated by this code will display
“New world” instead of “Hello world!” because the
shadow host will not be rendered.
4.1.3

Method details

To isolate the secure password input environment from
the application DOM, the traditional way that is based
on Shadow DOM v0 chooses the input element to
host a shadow tree, as shown in Fig. 6a. The new
input element in the shadow tree will be rendered
in place of the shadow host (i.e., the original input
element in the Web application code).
With the version upgrade of Shadow DOM, this
method cannot work on most Web browsers. Because
in Shadow DOM v1, only partial elements can be the
shadow host, and the input element cannot be the
shadow host anymore.
To take advantage of the flexibility and isolation
of Shadow DOM, the limitations of the traditional

(a)

method are made up. The process is described (shown
in Fig. 6b) as follows.
To ensure that the cleartext by user’s input is
contained in a shadow tree, one should choose a legal
element to host the shadow tree. In this situation, as the
input element cannot host a shadow tree, choose the
div element to be the shadow host that is supported
in Shadow DOM v1. What’s more, set the mode of
shadow root closed in order to prevent any access to
the node in a shadow root from the outside world. Then,
to add it into the Web application DOM, insert it into the
DOM tree as the brother node of the original password
input element.
Now, a secure isolated input widget has been built.
However, adding the new input element into the
Web application will cause a collision in the display.
Therefore, hide the original password input element by
modifying the CSS code.
Notice that the secure environment module will
listen on users’ keystroke events and transfer the
master password to the encryption module. After being
encrypted by the encryption module, the password will
be updated to the original password input element.
So that user interacts directly with the secure input
environment and it will not badly influence the normal
logic of the Web application. The sample of the whole
process is shown in Fig. 7.
4.2
4.2.1

Encryption module
Overview

The encryption module, running as a stub program,
aims to provide the encryption for the master password.
This module receives the user’s master password and
the current domain from the secure environment module
and the key file from the key management module.
Then, the encryption module dynamically obtains the
physical serial number of the security token and
decrypts the key file with it. After the decryption,

(b)

Fig. 6 (a) The traditional way to build a secure input
environment based on Shadow DOM v0; (b) our method to
build a secure input environment based on Shadow DOM v1.

Fig. 7 The sample of creating a secure password input
environment based on Shadow DOM v1.
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it will get the encryption key. SecurePWD uses this
key to encrypt the master password and updates the
secure environment module with the login password.
Therefore, the login password depends on the master
password and the domain of current Web site. The
same master password with different domains will
be generated for different login passwords. The same
domain with the different master passwords will be
generated to different login passwords, too.
4.2.2

Our encryption algorithm

In order to ensure the security of encryption
and decryption, most FPE schemes combine cycle
walking and an AES-based balanced feistel network[33] .
However, in this situation, the master password must
be encrypted to get different login passwords and it
does not need to be decrypted, i.e., a unidirectional
encryption algorithm that preserves the format is
needed.
The encryption algorithm (as shown in Algorithm 1
and Fig. 8) is described as follows.
 Key Dispersion. The domain name of the current
Web site was chosen as the dispersion factor that
Algorithm 1 Format-preserving encryption
1: // N is the length of the master password.
2: // login password[N] is an array of length N.
3: // AESkey (plaintext) is the AES encryption algorithm.
4: // modulo is the function of doing modulo operation.
5: session key
AESUdisk key.domain/
6: login password tmp
AESsession key .master password/
7: for eachi 2 Œ1; N do
8:
login passwordŒi
modulo.login password tmpŒi/
9: end for
10: return login password

A~Z

a~z

0~9

N characters
Key
dispersion

Enc(Udisk_key, domain, session_key)

Enc(session_key, master_password, login_password_tmp)

8 bits

…

8 bits

8 bits

128 bits
%

log_password

A~Z

%

%

a~z

0~9

A~Z

a~z

0~9

!…~

A~Z

a~z

0~9

!…~

N characters

Problem statement

However, a traditional encryption algorithm such as
Advance Encryption Standard (AES) in this situation
will lead to some problems. For example, ciphertext
may break the application front-end and back-end
verification because the format of ciphertext is different
from the cleartext[23, 24] . To solve this problem, an
encryption algorithm to generate ciphertext was chosen
that falls in the same domain as the plaintext.
Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE)[25–29] that has
been proposed recently aims to solve that problem[30, 31] .
The motivation of applying FPE comes from the
problems associated with encryption for restricted field
lengths or formats. The typical schemes of FPE are
integer[32] , character data[29] , datetime[25] , etc.
4.2.3

master_password

533

Fig. 8

The format-preserving encryption algorithm.

will be encrypted by the encryption key. The function
Enc (Udisk key, domain, session key) where Enc refers
to the AES encryption algorithm, and the session key
refers to the result of key dispersion.
 Format-preserving encryption. After key
dispersion, the session key is used to encrypt the master
password. The AES encryption algorithm is selected.
Then, the first N characters are chosen, where N is
equal to the length of the master password. In order to
preserve the format, a modulo operation is taken here
to make sure the ciphertext falls in the same domain
as the plaintext, i.e., after encryption, a capital letter is
still a capital letter, a number is still a number, and so
on.
Security analysis. The measure of a secure formatpreserving encryption algorithm is whether an attacker
can distinguish the format-preserving encryption from
a pseudorandom permutation. The security goal here is
Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP) security.
To describe the FPE algorithm and the pseudorandom
permutation, a value was chosen from f0; 1g randomly:
$

$

b
f0; 1g. A permutation was chosen randomly: P
Perm./, where Perm./ denotes the set of permutation.
Let A indicate an adversary with an oracle which
is either an encryption oracle or a permutation oracle.
Then the attacker, A, can be seen as the adversary
of format-preserving encryption Enc. To give attacker
adequate attack advantages, the attacker is allowed to
perform an encryption query and get response from the
encryption oracle Oracle (Encryption). The encryption
oracle allows the attacker to choose arbitrary plaintext
and obtain the corresponding ciphertext.
According to the attacker’s encryption query, based
on the value of b chosen randomly, the encryption
oracle decides whether to adopt pseudorandom
permutation or encryption oracle to response. If b D 0,
then Oracle (Encryption) is responded by a permutation
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oracle P ./, otherwise if b D 1, Oracle (Encryption) is
responded by our format-preserving encryption Enc.
The attacker’s goal is to verify if it is an encryption
oracle Enc or a permutation oracle P ./ after a certain
times of encryption queries. In other words, the attacker
aims to get a determined value b 0 . If b 0 D b, the attacker
wins the game, otherwise he/she fails. The advantage
PRP
of the attacker A can be described as AdvE
nc .A/ D
A
2P rŒPRPE nc ) t rue 1, where P rŒPRPA
E nc )
t rue is the probability of attacker to win the game.
The encryption oracle Enc of the FPE algorithm
is based on AES algorithm. Therefore, the
PRP
attacker’s advantage is equivalent to AdvE
nc .A/ D
A
2P rŒPRPAES ) t rue 1. It is obvious that if the AES
algorithm is a random permutation, the attacker cannot
obtain adequate advantage. Therefore, the security of
our format-preserving algorithm depends on the AES
algorithm. As the AES algorithm is proved to reach
the PRP security, therefore, our format-preserving
algorithm reaches the PRP security.
4.3

Key management module

The key management module maintains a key file stored
in the security token. When it is used for the first time,
one needs to initialize the security token in order to
generate a unique key file into the U-disk for the user.
To prevent the key file from being copied to the other
U-disks and revealing the encryption key, this file is
encrypted by the physical serial number of the U-disk.
The format of the key file is shown in Fig. 9, which
consists of an 80-bit time stamp, a 16-bit visit time,
and a 256-bit key. The 80-bit time stamp and 16-bit
visit time provide an access control for the key file in
SecurePWD. The time stamp records the time of last
access. The visit time records frequency of accesses. If
the frequency exceeds the secure threshold, the access
will be rejected. Therefore, the key management
module makes the brute force attack impossible. The
key used in AES-256 is initialized randomly based on
the time seed.

5

SecureData Implementation

In this section, the details about the implementation of
SecureData are given. The SecureData can be seen

Fig. 9

The format of the key file.

as the extension of SecurePWD. They have much in
common and this section will focus on the differences
between them.
5.1

Input sensitive data

When a user inputs sensitive data, SecureData builds
a secure environment that is similar to SecurePWD.
Then, the secure environment module transfers the
sensitive data to the encryption module that will do the
encryption.
In SecurePWD, the encryption algorithm is formatpreserving so that the format of the encrypted master
password is the same as the original one. However,
applying the format-preserving encryption algorithm
in SecureData seems impossible. The sensitive data
encrypted by SeucrePWD need not to be decrypted,
whereas the sensitive data encrypted by SeucreData
must be able to be decrypted so that users can use it. The
encrypted data must be able to be identified; therefore,
the format-preserving algorithm in SecurePWD is not
applicable in this case.
The encryption module of SecurePWD contains two
parts: the key dispersion process and the formatpreserving encryption process. SecureData just selects
the first part, i.e., the key dispersion. The encryption
module of SecureData receives the domain name of the
current website from the secure environment module
and the encryption key from the key management
module, then it encrypts the domain name by the
encryption key to get the session key. Then SecureData
uses AES encryption algorithm to encrypt the sensitive
data with this session key.
The ciphertext seems different from the cleartext
with the traditional block cipher algorithm due to
the block length. However, it’s hard to distinguish
by the computer programs. For this reason,
SecureData adds a signature to identify the ciphertext.
SecureData uses ==SecureDataStart== and
==SecureDataEnd== to mark the encrypted sensitive
data. For example, ==SecureDataStart==
ciphertext ==SecureDataEnd== stands for the data
which need to be decrypted.
5.2

Output sensitive data

To make the encryption transparent to users,
SecureData identifies the encrypted sensitive data
and decrypts it when it needs to be rendered.
In order to find the encrypted sensitive data,
SecureData searches the ==SecureDataStart==
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and
==SecureDataEnd==
signatures.
This
identification is realized by the secure environment
module. The string between the two signatures
is identified as the ciphertext which needs to be
decrypted. Then the secure environment module sends
the ciphertext and the domain of current Web site to the
encryption module.
The encryption module of SecureData receives the
ciphertext and domain from the secure environment
module and the encryption key from the key
management module. It first computes the session key
based on the domain name and encryption key. Then
the encryption module decrypts the ciphertext with the
session key.
After decryption, the encryption module sends the
results to the secure environment module. The secure
environment module builds a secure environment for it
and renders it to the user.

6

Evaluation

Based on SecureWeb, two concrete implementations,
SecurePWD and SecureData, are provided that have a
lot in common. To evaluate them, two aspects were the
focus: (1) the time cost of creating a secure environment
and (2) the time cost of encryption.
The performance overhead was measured by the
number of input elements of sensitive data. The test
was conducted on an Intel Core i7-6700 3.41 GHz x 8
with 16 GB of Random Access Memory (RAM).
Time cost of creating secure environment. As both
SecurePWD and SecureData need to create a secure
environment, in this test Web pages with 1–100 input
elements were established, and the result is shown in
Fig. 10. As illustrated, the time cost for SecurePWD
and SecureData to create secure environments increases

with the increase of sensitive fields. This is because
the increase in the number of elements will cause an
increase in the time of operations.
The result shows that the cost of creating 10 secure
input widgets is approximately 3 ms, and it takes less
than 10 ms to create 100 secure input widgets. The time
cost can be accepted by users. Notice that this test is far
beyond the practical use for SecurePWD because the
password input field in reality is usually one. The time
cost to create a secure input environment for one input
widget is approximately 2 ms, which is imperceptible
to users. Above all, the time cost in this step can be
ignored for the user experience.
Time cost of encryption. Time cost of encryption.
The time cost of encryption was first tested in
SecurePWD by using different algorithms. The
encryption module of SecurePWD encrypts the
user’s master password received from the secure
environment module. To estimate the effect of the
encryption efficiency of the algorithm, two kinds of
encryption schemes were chosen, namely the FFX
(Format-preserving, Feistel-based encryption, and X is
the parameter choice) mode of the Format-Preserving
Encryption (FPE) algorithm and the AES algorithm. Six
rounds of the format-preserving algorithm were used.
To simulate the actual situation, the strings with a
length from 1 to 16 were chosen because the length
of login passwords, in reality, will generally not be
longer than 16 characters. The execution time of the
encryption functions were logged in the console.
The result of the test is illustrated in Fig. 11. It is
clear that: (1) when FFX was used to encrypt strings
with a length less than 16, the time cost is between
1.2 ms and 1.4 ms; (2) when AES was used to encrypt
strings with a length less than 16, the time cost is about

Time taken to encrypt (ms)

Time taken to create
secure input environment (ms)

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

10
Number of password input ﬁelds

100

Fig. 10 The time cost for SecurePWD and SecureData to
create secure environment.

535

2.4
Our algorithm
2.2
FFX
2.0
AES
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Message length

Fig. 11 Time cost for SecurePWD to encrypt message by
different algorithms.
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Time taken to encrypt (ms)

0.2 ms; and (3) when the format-preserving algorithm
was used to encrypt strings with a length less than
16, the time cost is approximate to 0.3 ms, which
is little more than AES algorithm and far less than
FFX algorithm. This is because FFX needs to do
several rounds of cycle walking based on AES, while
the algorithm created here does not.
Then, the time cost for SecureData was tested.
The encryption algorithm in SecureData is similar to
SecurePWD, wherein the AES encryption algorithm
is chosen. The main difference between them is that
SecurePWD just encrypts the data with a short length,
whereas the SecureData needs to encrypt a longer
message. Therefore, the time cost for SecureData to
encrypt a message that has a length from 1 to 1000
characters was tested.
As illustrated in Fig. 12, the encryption takes under
2 ms for messages up to 100 characters long and 14 ms
for messages up to 1000 characters long. Therefore,
users will not notice the overhead.
The above experiments were based on the Google
Chrome browser. The time interval between inputting
the cleartext and receiving the encrypted data in the
secure environment module was tested. Next, the
time cost for encryption on different Web browsers
was tested. The time cost for SecureData to encrypt
messages with a length less than 1000 characters long
on the 360 and Baidu browsers was tested. The result of
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1

Fig. 12

the test is illustrated in Table 3. It was found that there
are minor differences in the time cost on different Web
browsers. However, the overhead is perfectly acceptable
on all of these browsers.
Overall, the performance is reasonably fast and the
cost can be completely accepted by the user.

7

Conclusion

This paper presented SecureWeb, a sensitive data
protection mechanism. Based on a browser extension,
SecureWeb provides a secure environment for user to
interact with the sensitive data. It provides encryption
and/or decryption in a stub program on users’ local
computer to put users in the control of their sensitive
data. What’s more, it chooses the U-disk as a security
token that enhances the security and provides a high
accessibility.
With SecureWeb, an application called SecurePWD
was implemented for password protection, which is
now an urgent need and in close correlation with
user information security. In contrast to previous
approaches, SecurePWD does not trust the security
of password storage devices. SecurePWD does not
store any passwords; instead, it dynamically generates
a login password based on the master password and
the domain of the current website. Besides, we also
extensively apply our mechanism in the protection of
diverse sensitive data, and implement SecureData.
The efficiency was evaluated and the experiments
demonstrated that this new mechanism is of practical
use and has a low overhead.
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